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Article 6

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

COMMENTS
PUBLICATION OF LIBEL-The recent North Carolina case of Hedgpeth v. Coleman' was an action for libel. It appeared that the defendant had sent a letter to
the plaintiff, a boy about fourteen years of age, unjustly accusing him of theft
and threatening to have him sent to the penitentiary if the goods and funds alleged to have been taken were not returned. Frightened by the letter, the
plaintiff showed it to his brother and to one Parrott. The brother showed the
letter to the plaintiff's father. Held, there was sufficient publication.
Unless a statute provides to the contrary, 2 the contents of a written defamatory statement, to be civilly actionable, must be communicated to the intelligence
of some person other than the one defamed.3 Otherwise there is no injury to the
esteem in which one is held by members of the community. For the action of
libel is a remedy for a wrong to one's reputation, rather than to one's own feelings. Thus, merely to write out or compose a defamatory statement does not
invoke liability. 4 Nor, generally, is it libel to send insulting statements directly
to the person accused. 5 On the other, hand, it is not necessary that the defamatory matter be published to the public generally. It is enough if it reaches the
consciousness of any member of the community other than the sender and the
person defamed. 6
The more frequently recurring case, in which publication presents little difficulty, is that in which the defendant himself sends or shows the defamatory
statement directly to the third person. 7 Equally clear is the case at the other extreme, where the recipient of matter defaming himself voluntarily and without
justification shows it to another. Here the defendant escapes liability because
of the plaintiff's responsible contribution to his own injury.8
The more troublesome cases are those lying between these two extremes.
Here liability seems to depend upon whether the sender, as a reasonable person,
should have foreseen that the matter was likely to reach the consciousness os a
third person, though sent or shown to the person defamed. In other words, in
these cases as in the two situations first referred to, the fundamental test is one of
responsible causation of plaintiff's injury. So, where the defendant is actually
ignorant of the plaintiff's illiteracy, 9 or of the fact that a clerk or a member of
the family usually opens the plaintiff's mail,' 0 the defendant is not liable. But
1 183 N. C. 309, 111 S. E. 517 (1922). See 32 Yale L. J. 90.
2 See Rolland v. Batchelder, 84 Va. 664. 5 S. E. 695 (1888).
R Watts v. Greenlee, 13 N. C. 115 (1829); Pullman v. Hill 1 Q. B. 524, 60 L. 3. Q. B. 299, 64 L. T.
Rep. 691 (1891). For publication in criminal libel, see 17 R. 6. L. 462; State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266, 18
Am. Dec. 105 (1828); Kramer v. Perkins, 10 Minn. 455. 113 N. W. 1062, 15 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1141 (1907).
'Weir v. Hoss, 6 Ala. 881 (1844); Youmans v. Smith, 153 N. Y. 214, 47 N. E. 265 (1897).
S Wilcox v. Moon. 64 Vt. 450, 24 Atl. 244, 33 Am. St. Rep. 936. 15 L. R. A. 760 (1892).
eAdams v. Lawson, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 250, 94 Am. Dec. 455 (1867). And see State v. Mclntire, 115 N.
C. 769, 20 S. E. 721 (1894).
'Bacon v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 55 Mich. 224, 21 N. W. 324, 54 Am. Rep. 372 (1884); McCarlie v.
Atkinson, 77 Miss. 594. 27 So. 641. 78 Am. St. Rep. 540 (1900).
8 Gough v. Goldsmith, 44 Wis. 262, 28 Am. Rep. 579 (1878); Wilcox v. Moon, supra, note 5.
'State v. Syphrett, 27 S. C. 29. 2 S. E. 624, 13 Am. St. Rep. 616, and note (1887); Jackson v.
Staley, 9 Ont. Rep. 334.
"Roberts v. English Mfg. Co.. 155 Ala. 414, 46 So. 752 (1908).
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where the defendant writes the defamatory statement on a postal card," or sends
it in an unsealed envelope by a messenger who reads it,12 or where he knows or
has reason to know that the plaintiff customarily has a clerk open his letters, 13 or
is illiterate,1 4 liability attaches. 15
The principal case is an example of the latter situation. The defendant, as
a reasonable person, should have known that a young boy, unjustly accused of a
theft of goods and moneys belonging in part to the United States postoffice and
to an express company, and threatened with serious punishment in case he did
not return that which he did not have, would show the letter to those upon whom
he naturally felt dependent for protection and advice.
G. C. H., Jr.
WIFE'S CONFINEMENT IN INSANE ASYLUM AS CAUSE FOR DIVORCE-In Lee
v. Lee' the facts were these: H and W were married in 1896. In 1910, W was
committed to the state hospital for the insane, where she has since remained. In
1921, H brought suit for divorce, under C. S. sec. 1659, authorizing divorces "on
.in the following cases . . . (4) If
application of the party injured .....
there has been a separation of husband and wife, and they have lived separate,
Held, judgment for defendant
and apart for five 2 successive years ........
affirmed.
This cause for divorce was added by an act of 1907, 3 amendatory of sec.
1561 of the Revisal of 1905. That section, like the present section of the Consolidated Statutes just quoted, authorized divorces to be given on the application
of the injured party. Nevertheless, because the amendment itself did not contain
such a stipulation, the court held, in Cooke v. Cooke,4 decided in 1913, that the new
provision required a divorce to be given upon proof of mere severance of marital
associations for the statutory period, regardless of the fault of either party, and
in spite of the fact that the plaintiff had brought about the separation by abandonment of the wife. The incorporation of the amendment of 1907 into sec. 1659
of the Consolidated Statutes, in 1919, however, thus making the provision subject to the requirement that the action be brought by the injured party, relieved
5
the court from following the Cooke case in Sanderson v. Sanderson, 'decided in
1919, and enabled it to hold that a divorce cannot be granted when the separation
11Logan v. Hodges. 146 N. C. 38, 59 S. E. 349 (1907). Note that cases on this question are decided,
in part at least, by the federal statute (2 U. S. Compiled Statutes, sec. 3894, sub-sec. 5. p. 2661) prohibiting under severe penalties the mailing of post cards containing defamatory matter.
U Rolland v. Batchelder. note 2 supra.
'J Rummey %'. Wortham, 186 Mass. 144. 71 N. E. 316 (1904); Delacroix v. Thevenot, 2 Stark 63. 3
Eng. C. L. Rep. 317 (1817); Pullman v. Hill, note 3 supra.
24A41en v. Wortham, 89 Ky. 485, 13 S. W. 73 (1890).
1515 L. R. A. 1141. note.
1 182 N. C. 61, 108 S. E. 352 (1921).
2
The necessary period of separation was reduced from 10 to 5 years by P. L., 1921, ch. 63. The complaint in the principal case alleged a 10 years' separation. The court's charge to the jury, however, was
predicated upon the amended statute.
aP. L., 1907, ch. 89. This was amended in a particular irrelevant to the present discussion in P. L.,
1913, ch. 165. For the prior statutory policy, see P. L., 1895, ch. 277; P. L., 1899, ch. 211; P. L., 1903,
ch. 490. By P. L., 1905, ch. 499, all laws passed since the code of 1883 creating any cause for divorce
were repealed. The Revisal of 1905 did not provide for separation or abandonment as a cause for divorce.
4 164 N. C. 275, 80 S. E. 178 (1913).
5178 N. C. 339, 100 S. E. 590 (1919).
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has been caused by the wrongful act of the plaintiff. Conversely, the implication of the Sanderson case is that the separation must be one in which the
plaintiff's injury is caused by the conduct of the defendant.
Must this conduct be voluntary or -wrongful? No difficulty arises where
the defendant wilfully and without cause wholly abandons the plaintiff.0 Similarly, when, after the termination of the prescribed duration of a voluntary desertion, the defendant is imprisoned for a crime or is incarcerated in an insane
asylum, the same result should obtain. 7 Another situation is that in which the
original taking of leave has been voluntary enough, but where during the
statutory period, the defendant is confined in prison s or in an insane asylum.0
There is a distinction here, based upon the defendant's responsibility for his
confinement. And, in the absence of controlling statutes, the cases seem to proceed on the basis of that distinction. Conceivably, the likelihood of a return
to the plaintiff had the defendant been free to do so, should also be taken into
account.
Still another situation is that in which the separation was begun and continued for the entire period by the defendant's imprisonment o or confinement
in an insane asylum." Again, in the case of the prisoner, most courts seem to
hold, even under a statute requiring a voluntary separation, that a divorce may
be granted. This, because the imprisonment was not without the defendant's
fault. But in the insanity case, most courts refuse a divorce. Not only is the
separation involuntary; it is free from fault. And it has been thought that a
contrary result would be a violation of the marital obligation to remain loyal in
the event of misfortune. The principal case is one of this latter type.
R. P. D.
LIABILITY

OF TERMINAL

CARRIER UNDER

INTERSTATE

COMMERCE

ACT-

The recent North Carolina case of Moore and Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., involved
the following facts: Plaintiffs were consignees of a box of clothing which had
been shipped to them in North Carolina from New York, over the Pennsylvania
and Southern railroads. A through bill of lading had been issued by the Pennsylvania, the initial carrier, exempting it and each of the connecting carriers from
liability for loss or injury nQt occurring on its own road, unless that liability
should be imposed by law. The Southern, the terminal carrier, delivered the
box in Asheville and collected the freight. When opened, the box was found
to be empty. In an action against the terminal carrier, the jury found that the
loss occurred, not because of any fault upon the part of the defendant, but
e See Setzer v. Setzer, 128 N. C. 170, 38 S. E. 731 (1901).
'Harrigan v. Harrigan, 135 Cal. 397, 67 Pac. 506 (1902); Gordon v. Gordon, 89 N. 3. Eq. 535, 105
All. 242, 244 (1918).
aHews v. Hews, 7 Gray (Mass.) 279 (1856); compare Hyland v. Hyland, 55 N. '.Eq. 35, 36 Atl. 270
(1896).
In general, in connection with this note and those following, see L. R. A. 1918 A, 1184, note,
and Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation, and Domestic Relations, 6th ed., sec. 1621, and case, cited.
gGordon v. Gordon, note 7, supra.
1
0 Davis v. Davis, 102 Ky. 440, 43 S. W. 168 (1897).
12Messick v. Messick, 177 Ky. 337, 197 S. W. 792, L. R. A. 1918 A, 1184 (1917); Daugherty v.
Daugherty, (Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S. W. 985 (1917).
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through the negligence of the initial carrier. Held, judgment for defendant
affirmed.'
In the absence of statute or of a special contract, a common carrier of goods
2
is liable at common law as an insurer for loss or damage caused on its own line.
This rule, of course, is subject to the usual exceptions relating to an act of God
or of the public enemy and the like. Conversely, under this rule, a carrier is not
liable for loss occurring on the route of a connecting carrier. The clause in
the bill of lading in the principal case seems to be merely declaratory of this
principle and an attempt to exempt the carrier from the opposite principle which
obtains in a minority of the states.3 But the carrier may by contract reduce its
liability, for losses caused on its own road, from that of an insurer to that of
liability for negligence only. 4 Such contracts now constitute standard clauses in
nearly all bills of lading. Similarly, by special contract either with the shipper
or with the associated lines, the carrier may extend its responsibility over the
entire route so as to make it liable for loss or damage occasioned anywhere along
the line. 5
This last result is obtained as to the initial carier at common law by the
courts of England and of a few of the American states which hold the connect6
ing carriers under a through bill of lading to be agents of the initial carrier. To
7
the same effect are the amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. Under
this statute, as amended, the initial carrier in an interstate shipment is today
8
compelled to issue a through bill of lading, is made liable for all loss or damage
occurring en route, 9 and is given an action over against the connecting carrier on
10
It is further provided that no contract shall
whose line the injury took place.
operate to exempt the initial carrier from this responsibility, and that nothing
in the act shall deprive the holder of the through bill of lading of any remedy
accruing under existing law. This last clause, however, has reference only to
the existing federal law." While it is suggested in the dissenting opinion in the
principal case that this enactment makes the connecting railroads partners and
therefore equally liable, the view taken by the majority of the North 12Carolina
court and by the Supreme Court of the United States in a similar case, is that
1 183 N. C. 213, 111 S. E. 166 (1922).
Myrick v. Mich. Cent. Ry. Co., 107 U. S. 102, 27 L. Ed. 325 (1883); Backhouse v. Sneed, 5 N. C.
173 (1808).
$See the cases cited in note 6, post.
&Hart v. Penna. Ry. Co., 112 U. S. 331, 28 L. Ed. 717 (1884); Capehart v. R. R. Co., 81 N. C. 438
(1879).
5 Myrick v. Mich. Cent. Ry. Co., supra, note 2; Phiffer v. R. R. Co., 89 N. C. 311 (1883).
e Watson v. Anbergate, N. and B. Ry., (1852 Q.B.) 15 Jur. 448; III. Match Co. v. Chicago, R. I.
P. Ry. 250 Ill. 396, 95 N. E. 492 (1911); Allen v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 42 Wash. 64, 84 Pac. 620 (1906);
32 Yafe L. J. 84.
1U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 8604a, 8604aa.
8 See Parker Bell Lumber Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Wash. 123, 124 Pac. 389, 41 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 1064 (1912); A. C. L. Ry. Co. v. Riverside Mills, note 9, post.
I See Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491. 33 Sup. Ct. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314. 44 L. R. A. (n.
.)251 (1913): A. C. L. Ry. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 31 Sup. Ct. 164, 55 L. Ed. 167, 31 L. R.
A. (n. s.) 7 (1911).
11Galveston. H. & S. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 32 Sup. Ct. 205, 56 L. Ed. 516 (1912).
U Express Co. v. Croniger, supra, note 9.
"Oregon.Washington Ry. Co. v. McGinn, 42 Sup. Ct. 332 (1922); commented upon in 32 Yale L. J.
84, and 36 Harv. Law Rev. 109.
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the Interstate Commerce Act merely operates to make succeeding carriers agents
of the initial carrier.
Clearly, therefore, the holder of the bill of lading still has his common law
remedy against the carrier on whose line the loss or damage took place, 13 and,
in addition, the new statutory remedy against the initial carrier. The court in
the principal case applied the common law rule and held the Interstate Commerce Act inapplicable. The existence of a special contract not being either
alleged or proved, the clause in the bill of lading not amounting to such a con14
tract, and the jury having found that the loss was caused by the initial carrier,
the terminal carrier was not liable at common law. It has been suggested' 5 that
since the consignee is usually the one to sue, and since the initial carrier is often
amenable to service only in the state where the shipment originated, the statute
should be further amended to make "the terminal carrier liable for damage
caused anywhere en route with remedy over against the negligent road."
A. E. C.
STATE LOANS TO COUNTIES FOR SCHOOLS IN NORTH CAROLINA-In the recent
case of Lacy, State Treasurcr, v. Fidelity Bank of Durham,' the facts were as
follows: An act of 19212 authorized a state'bond issue of $5,000,000, the proceeds of which were to be loaned through the state educational authorities to
county boards of education for expenditure in connection with the purchase of
school sites, and the erection, repair, or equipment of public school houses, dormitories, and teacherages. These county loans were to be evidenced by the notes
of the county boards of education, and were to constitute liens upon the county
school funds. The moneys borrowed by the counties were to be returned to the
state treasurer, with interest, in twenty annual installments, and were to be raised
by a special building fund tax in each county making use of the loan. In compliance with this statute, the plaintiff treasurer issued the bonds and contracted
to sell them to the defendant bank. Thereafter, the purchaser refused to proceed with the deal on the ground that the act authorizing the bond issue was
unconstitutional. In a controversy without action, held, the act is valid.
The Constitution of North Carolina, in the article on Education, contains
the following provisions: "Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged. ''3 "The general assembly, at its first session
under this constitution, shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and
uniform system of public schools, wherein tuition shall be free of charge to all
13Elliott v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. 35 S. D. 57, 150 N. W. 777 (1915); Eaitern Mule, ctc., Co. v. A.
C. L. Ry. Co., 99 S. C. 470, 83 S. 2. 597 (1914).
14 In Chicago N. W. Ry. Co. v. Whitnack Produce Co., 42 Sup. Ct. 328 (1922), plaintiff recovered
against the terminal carrier upon an unrebutted presumption that loss occurred on defendant's line. It was
not shown where loss did in fact take place. See 36 Harv. L. Rev. 109.
"32 Yale L. J. 84. and see the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Clark in the principal case.
1183 N. C. 373, 111 S. E. 612 (1922).
P. L., 1921, ch. 147.
s Art. 9, sec. 1.
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the children of the state between the ages of six and twenty-one years .... 4
"Each county of the state shall be divided into a convenient number of districts,
in which one or more public schools shall be maintained at least six months in
every year; and if the commissioners of any county shall fail to comply with the
aforesaid requirements of this section, they shall be liable to indictment." 5
These provisions have had the effect of placing the responsibility for public
education directly upon the state government, and of making the counties and
school districts the local administrative agencies of the state for educational purposes.6 A secondary effect has been that of making the cost of the maintenance
of public schools for the prescribed period paramount to substantially all
constitutional limitations upon the taxing power. 7
The statute in question was enacted to discharge the duty of the state to
provide for the urgently needed enlargement and rehabilitation of the physical
plant of the state school system, and to extend to the local units of the system
the use of the state's larger facilities for obtaining funds for such purposes.8
The only' constitutional limitations that seriously endangered the validity of
the statute were these: "And the general assembly shall have no power to give
or lend the credit of the state in aid of any person, association or corporation,
. . . .unless the subject be submitted to a direct vote of the people of the
state, and be approved by a majority of those who shall vote thereon." 9 "No
county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge
its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers
of the same, except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the
majority of the qualified voters therein."'1
The statute did not require a vote either of the people of the state or of
the people of the counties that were to make use of the loans. Thus the problem
before the court was whether the extensions of credit and the incurring of the
debts contemplated by the statute were subject to either of these two requirements
of a popular vote. Fundamentally, the question for judicial determination was
whether the particular financial scheme provided by this statute for the -enlargement and rehabilitation of the physical school plant was one so sanctioned by the
provisions of the educational article of the constitution as to be free from these
two limitations upon the borrowing and taxing powers of the state and county
governments."
The purpose of the constitutional provision first quoted was that of restrict'Art. 9, sec. 2.
5Art. 9, sec. 3.
C. S. ch. 95. See also the excellent brief of the Attorney General in the principal case, pp. 3-15; N.
C. Const., Art. 9, see. 10; and Bd. of Ed. of Duplin County v. State Bd. of Ed., 114 N. C. 317, 19 S. E.
277 (1894).
7 Collie v. Commrs., 145 N. C. 170, 59 S. E. 44 (1907), overruling Barksdale v. Commrs., 93 N. C.
172 (1885).
See also the present provisions of N. C. Const., Art. 5, sec. 6: "Provided, this limitation
shall not apply to taxes levied for the maintenance of the public schools of the state for the term required
by article nine, section three, of the constitution." Compare 1 N. C. L. Rev. 56, and McIntosh, Special
TaoSchool Districts in North Carolina, 1 N'. C. L. Rev. 88, supra.
8P. L., 1921, ch. 147, preamble.
9Art. 5, sec. 4.
"' Art. 7, sec. 7.
u' See authorities cited in note 7, supra.
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ing the former practice of loaning the proceeds of state bond issues to private
internal development projects, such as railroads, canals, toll roads, and turn
pikes. Many of these ventures had turned out disastrously with the result that
the state had become heavily burdened with debts for which little benefit had
been received. In short, the requirement of a popular vote was designed as a
check upon the state going into debt for the primary benefit of persons, associations and corporations other than itself. 12 Clearly, the restriction was never
intended to be applicable to a case where the state was borrowing money to finance through its own agencies so mandatory a state function as that of developing its school system. And the court in the principal case so held. Conceivably, the state might have done this directly, by distributing the proceeds of the
bonds where needed and by raising money to pay off the debt by statewide
taxation. The fact that it chose to put the responsibility for repaying the loan
upon the local administrative units of the school system in direct ratio to the
benefits received did not operate to change the plan from one whereby the state
was discharging its constitutional duty in connection with schools to a scheme
by which the state was lending its credit primarily for the benefit of persons,
associations, and corporations distinct from itself.
The second constitutional provision quoted presents a more intricate problem of constitutional construction. Its purpose was that of adding to the necessity of legislative authority, a second check upon the incurring of unwise municipal debts, namely, the popular approval of other than necessary local expenditures.13 The question, however, whetler the erection, enlargement or repair
of a school house is a necessary expense for a county or a school district, does
not rest upon the interpretation of this provision alone. One must take into account the relationship between this provision and the urgent requirement
of the educational article of the constitution, that the counties, as the local educational agencies of the state, maintain public schools in each school district for the
prescribed period, now six months.
In view of this mandate, it would be difficult to construe the requirement
of a vote in the municipality as a condition precedent to the raising of funds
with which to provide for the housing of a school for the six month period.
What the constitution requires to be done cannot be made to depend upon the
discretion of the people. Thus the costs of school houses to be used for the six
months period are not necessary expenses of municipal corporations as such,' 4
for the reason that they are indispensable expenditures of counties and school
districts in their capacities as administrative agencies of a state school system.
Expenditures incident to the maintenance of schools for a period longer than
that prescribed by the educational article of the constitution, however, do not
thereby become necessary expenses of the local government units, even of school
12 183 N. C.at pp. 379-380; Galloway v. Jenkins, 63 N. C. 147 (1869);
12

University R. R. v. Holden,

1Hill v. Lenoir County, 176 N. C. 572, 97 S. E. 498 (1918); Connor and Cheshire, N. C. Const.,
Ann., 1910, pp. 313-315.
"4Stephens v. Charlotte, 172 N. C. 564, 90 S. E. 588 (1916).
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districts. This is because of the constitutional conception of public education as
the peculiar function of the state, rather than of local government. Thus, even
that which is not made compulsory by the constitution, but which is undertaken
voluntarily by the local units, is still a state matter and not one incident to municipal functions as such, as are the maintenance of public buildings and roads
in counties.' 5 But, since the extra provision for schools is not required by the
constitution, the popular vote must be had.16 That is, the moment an expenditure escapes the sanction of the requirements of the educational article, all
7
limitations on local indebtedness becomes operative.'
The court had no difficulty in the principal case in holding' 8 that the financial
scheme provided for by the statute in question was sufficiently sanctioned by the
educational article of the constitution to be free from the requirement ol a
popular vote in the local units that were to incur the indebtedness to the state.
Such a statewide program of rehabilitation of school properties, carried out with
funds originally procured by the state, under the immediate supervision of the
state educational authorities, and so urgently needed for furnishing the educational advantages required for the youth of the state, was simply a plan for
enabling the local units, as the educational agencies of the state, to carry out the
constitutional mandate. As has been suggested, the fact that the responsibility
for repaying the loans was placed upon the local units of the school system in
direct ratio to the benefits received did not operate to make the undertaking a
purely local measure, entirely distinct from state significance.
E. B. H.
PRIORITY OF AUTOMOBILE MECHANIC'S LIEN-Johnson v. Yates,' decided
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1922, involved the following facts:
Plaintiff sold an automobile to A, and took a note secured by a mortgage on the
car for the balance of the purchase price. The mortgagor was given possession,
and the mortgage was duly registered. Thereafter, the mortgagor, without
either the actual knowledge or the express consent of plaintiff, sent the car to
defendants' shop for necessary repairs. The repairs were made without. defendants' actual knovledge of the existence of plaintiff's mortgage. The charges
not being paid, the defendants held the car and claimed a mechanic's lien under
C. S. sec. 2435. Plaintiff insisted that his mortgage lien was superior. Held,
the mechanic's lien takes priority.
At common law, the artisan has a lien on personal property for work done
or repairs made thereon. This lien, however, merely gives the artisan the right
to retain possession of the property until the debt due has been satisfied. He
has no right at common law to sell the property. Under given circumstances,
this mechanic's lien may be superior to prior liens on the same property. Thus,
McLin v. Newbern, 70 N. C. 12 (1874); Guire v. Commrs., 177 N. C. 516, 99 S. E. 430 (1919);
Woodall v. Commrs., 176 N. C. 377, 97 S. E. 226 (1918).
"Bd. of Ed. v. Bd. of Commrs., 178 N. C. 305, 100 S. E. 698 (1919).
"TNote 7, jupra.
1h183 N. C. at p, 382.
2 183 N. C. 24, 110 S. E. 603 (1922).
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where a mortgagee of personal property has given express or implied authority
to the mortgagor to have work done or repairs made on the property, the artisan's
common law lien takes priority over the mortgage. 2 Similarly, when the buyer
of personal property gives purchase money notes to the vendor, and takes possession, the vendor reserving legal title until the notes are paid, the granting of
express or- implied authority to the vendee to have repairs made gives the mechanic's common law lien priority over the rights of the vendor.3 Conversely,
without this authority of the one in possession to procure repairs, a mortgage of
which the artisan has actual or constructive notice prevails over his common law
4
lien.
A new mechanic's lien, entirely created by statute, however, may entail different consequences. Unless the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, otherwise provides, the duly recorded mortgage will take precedence over
the subsequently attaching statutory lien.5 But the lien provided by C. S. sec.
2435 is not a purely statutory creation. Rather, it seems to be a statutory recognition of the common law lien and an attempt to confer a new remedy,( namely,
the right of the mechanic, instead of merely retaining possession until the debt
is paid, to sell the property and realize his charges.
Thus the principal question involved in the case under discussion was
whether the mortgagee had in fact given the mortgagor authority to procure the
repairs. There had been no express mention of the matter. The court worked
out an implied authority from the fact that the mortgagor was allowed to retain
possession of the automobile and to use it, a circumstance giving rise to the
1
likelihood that repairs to the car would inevitably become necessary.
While it is of course true that repairs to automobiles are usually made in
emergencies, so that it might be inequitable to charge the mechanic with constructive notice of a recorded mortgage,8 the basic reason for the suspension of
the effect of a recorded mortgage9 in such a case as that of Johnson v. Yates,
seems to be this: the mortgagee, who actually gives express or implied authority
to have repairs made, waives, in favor of the mechanic, any rights that accrued
under the registration laws. These rights were created for his benefit, and he
agrees to their suspension by his conduct in empowering the one in possession
of the car to incur charges for such repairs as are necessary to its full use. Nor
is he injured thereby, for presumably the value of the security of the car with
repairs made is not less than its value in bad condition.
L. T. H.
2 Hammond v. Danielson 126 Mass. 294 (1879); Drummond Carriage Co. v. Mills, 54 'Neb. 417, 74 N.
W. 966 (1898); Ruppert v. kang, 73 N. J. Law, 216, 62 Ad. 998 (1906); Watts v. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 116,
26 N. E. 680 (1891).
5
Broom v. Dale, 109 Miss. 52, 67 So. 659 (1915).
'Globe Works v. Wright 106 Mass. 207 (1870); Denison v. Shaler, 11 N. W. 402, 47 Mich. 598
(1882); Birsell v. Pearce, 28 k. Y. 252 (1863); Shaw v. Webb, 131 Tenn. 173, 174 S. W. 273 (1915).
6 See Williams v. Davis, 183 N. C. 90, 110 S. E. 577 (1922); Baker v. Robbins, 119 N. C. 289, 25
S. E. 876 (1896).
'McDougall v. Crapon, 95 N. C. 292 (1886).
'House v. Parker, 181 N. C. 40, 106 S. E. 137 (1921); Jones, Liens, sec. 744;Broom v. Date, supra;
Ruppcrt v. Zang, supra. 6 C. J. p. 1138, and cases cited. Contra, see 9 Va. L. Rev. 136; Adders v.
Godfrey, 153 Wis. 186, 145 N. W. 1115; Shaw v. Webb, supra.
8 Smith Auto Co. v. Kaestner, 164 Wis. 205, 159 N. W. 738 (1916).
9 Harper v. Edwards, 115 N. C. 246, 20 S. E. 392 (1894).
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CORPORATION CODE, ANNOTATED.

By Pou, Bailey, and

Pou, and J. L. Emanuel, of the Bar of Raleigh, N. C. Atlanta, The Harrison
Company, 1922. pp. 1021.
The title of this volume does not indicate the comprehensive range of its
contents. The North Carolina Corporation Code proper occupies less than onetenth of the book. The volume consists of three parts. Part 1, containing 502
pages, embraces a large number of statutes relating to corporation organization
and activity, together with notes of the more important cases which have construed the provisions. Part 2, covering 384 pages, offers detailed forms and
suggestions for their use in connection with corporate transactions. The third
part includes various appendices setting forth federal and state court rules,
cotton and tobacco pool documents, a table of cases, and a table of comparative
section numbers.
In addition to the Corporation Code, Part 1 includes selected sections of
the statutes relating to civil procedure, conveyances, liens, and attachments, and
the complete statutes relating to criminal liability of corporate officers and employes, child welfare, a corporation's duty to its employes, hours of service of
employes of carriers, earnings of employes of corporations engaged in interstate
commerce, monopolies and trusts, banks, negotiable instruments, co6perative organizations, drainage corporations, warehouses, railroads, insurance, rural communities, municipal corporations, and taxation.
In general, the organization of the statutory material follows the order of
the chapters and sections of the Consolidated Statutes. The editors have, however, given new and consecutive numbers to the sections, citing the official section
numbering at the end of each section. A table of comparative sections, in the
appendix at page 917, is of help in this connection. The statutes are complete
up to and including the acts of the extra session of 1921.
The annotations are not meant to be exhaustive. Only a few of the cases
decided under the corporation law as it stood prior to the adoption of the Corporation Code in 1901 are given. The annotations appear to include, however,
all of the important cases in which the later statutes have been construed by. the
federal and state courts up to January 1, 1922. A table of cases is printed in the
appendix at page 905. The cases given are not merely cited by title, but a brief
note, taken frequently from the West Publishing Company's digests and headnotes, indicates the significance of each case. In addition, the citation of eadh
North Carolina case includes the West Publishing Company's key number, by
use of which similar cases can be located in the Southeastern and American
Digests.
The corporate forms and suggestions for their use in Part 2 will be found
to be of great value. The scope of the transactions dealt with in this section of
the book may be indicated by reference to the fact that a form is given for the
creation of a business trust as a substitute for a corporation. It is unfortunate,
however, that this part of the volume is not more clearly set off from the first

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
part, either by a distinctive running head or by a heavy colored paper marker.
With the thin paper pages, it is difficult to locate.
The volume is well indexed, and is readably printed in large type on thin
paper. The binding is of limp red leather. The North Carolina Corporation
Code, Annotated, should find a place on the desk of every attorney, banker, and
corporation executive in North Carolina.
It is to be hoped that the editors will publish a supplement at the end of
each legislative session, similar to the Amendments to the Consolidated Statutes,
issued by the Legislative Reference Library, at Raleigh. Otherwise the book will
soon become out of date.
M. T. V. H.

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-Mr. Ernest
Knaebel, Reporter of the United States Supreme Court, has made the following
announcement:
The official United States Supreme Court Reports, heretofore published by
the Banks Law Publishing Co., New York City, are now to be issued by the
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. The last volume handled by
the Banks Co. was numbered 256. Volumes 257, 258, and 259, covering the last
term, will be available shortly. Advance sheets, contained in four pamphlets for
each volume, will be issued for twenty-five cents each. The bound volumes will
cost about $2.10 each, and will correspond with the advance sheets in page numbering. Separate orders need not be sent in for each pamphlet or volume, but
standing orders with advance deposits must be maintained with the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

The publishers' supply of the June NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW is exhausted. Orders are still coming in, many of them from libraries, for copies of
this number with which to begin complete files. Those who do not desire to
retain their copies of the June number permanently will enable the REvIEW to
fill these orders if they will return their copies at once to P. 0. Box 810, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina. Postage will be refunded promptly.
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THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS, a corporation not for profit,

has taken over the publication of THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW, The Journal of the Elisha Mitchell Scientific Society, Studies in Philology, The High
School Journal, The Journal of Social Forces, The James Sprunt Historical
Publications, The University of North Carolina Extension Bulletin, and The
University News Letter, heretofore issued by separate units of the University of
North Carolina. The PRESS is managed by a board of governors, consisting of
nine members of the faculty, of the president of the University, and of three
members of the board of trustees, as follows: L. R. Wilson, Louis Graves, Edwin Greenlaw, W. C. Coker, L. P. McGehee, N. W. Walker, H. W. Odum, J.
G. DeR. Hamilton, C. D. Snell, H. W. Chase, Leslie Weil, A. M. Scales, and Zeb.
V. Walser. The officers of the PRESS are L. R. Wilson, director, and Louis
Graves, secretary. Offices are maintained on the campus, in Chapel Hill.
This involves no change, however, in the editorial management of the
REVIEW. As heretofore, the editorial staff will consist of the members of the
faculty and of a number of the students of The School of Law.

In John C. Calhoun's Day
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY
WAS THE

Only LAW

DICTIONARY

It is still the "only" law dictionary to buy, if you want
the most complete law dictionary published
RAWLE'S Third Revision
combines in one work
a. An ENCYCLOPEDIA of the law, giving concise but
thorough articles on all topics of the law and citing the
leading cases. The encyclopedic features of the work have
been enlarged and developed by the present editor.
b. A DICTIONARY of legal terms, phrases and words including those from the common, civil, canon, feudal, and
other foreign law.
c. A GLOSSARY of law Latin and law French.
d. A brief COMMENTARY on American government and
institutions, including matters relating to the executive,
legislative, and judicial departments, the political and civil
rights and duties of citizens, and to important developments of the law.

Bouvier is the Corner Stone
of the Lawyer's Library - 3500 pages

$22.50 delivered

WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, St. Paul, Minn.
You may send me a complimentary copy of the pamphlet containing a reprint of the
topic of [ ] Restraint of Trade (or [ ] Domicil) from Rawle's Third Revision of Bouvier's
Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia.
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